Introduction
One of the merits of the target article is to bring into sharp focus some of the fundamental issues that a syntax-based approach raises about knowledge of language and knowledge of the primitive elements in the various linguistic interfaces. Questions about roots, then, amount to questions on what a syntax-based model of grammar like DM has to say about lexical knowledge. The comments that follow centre on two such issues: the relations between the lists into which DM distributes lexical knowledge, and the nature of roots as morphological objects.
2 Roots across lists: syntactic and semantic atoms of lexical words 2.1 Harley confirms and sharpens Marantz' (1997) factorization of the open lexicon into three sets of listemes: the atoms of syntax, of meaning, and of 'form', each representing a different facet of lexical roots. With respect to earlier statements (see Marantz 1997 and Noyer 2000) , the present one is clearer as it explicitly argues that neither the meaning nor the form associated with a root can uniquely identify it (2.2, 2.3, 2.4). A syntax-internal definition of root then emerges, systematically related to a semantic and to a phonological representation (see (13)- (16)) but neither identified by nor reducible to either of them. The present discussion eliminates a lingering ambiguity concerning the notion of 'Vocabulary Item', which earlier DM work often presented not as the exponent in a realization rule (like /kaet/), but as the realization rule itself (like √CAT ↔ /kaet/;
cf. Noyer and Harley 1999: 'A Vocabulary Item is, properly speaking, a relation between a phonological string or "piece" and information about where that piece may be inserted'). Evidently, lexical competence involves not just knowledge of the elements in the lists, but also of the relations between them. Note, however, that while the model here presented states explicitly the association of each syntactic root with its form and with its meaning, as in (13), nothing guarantees that the composition of the lists is such to allow a one-to-one map. Harley relies on this to account for the fact that neither a single 'atomic form' nor a single 'atomic sense' always identifies a lexical root. The point can be pressed further, noting cases of syncretism whereby one lexical item (identified by its semantic content and syntactic properties) takes the root form of a distinct lexical item in some cells of its morphological paradigm; for instance, in Italian, the past participles of essere 'to be' and stare 'to stay' have the same form stato (unlike the Spanish estar, the Italian stare is unambiguously a full lexical verb in Italian). Even more clearly, the three-list model accounts naturally for the use of lexical roots as grammatical morphemes in so-called 'semi-lexical' categories, like the forms of the verbs venire 'to come' and werden 'to become' used as passive auxiliaries in Italian and German respectively (see Acquaviva, in press), or like the widespread use of certain nouns as quantity determiners, as in the French nombre de N or force de N with the value 'many N'. One may note that the fact that root forms under-determine 'lexical items' was recognized by Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995: 28) , in cases where one verb's 'name' is paired to two distinct lexical semantic templates, like shovel as a verb of removal and as a verb of putting (see Acquaviva 2014) . As it is outlined here, however, the model states pairings across elements in the lists via realization rules and statements of semantic content, but nothing constrains these maps. And without any principled constraint, the model does not make many predictions about what can and cannot happen in the formal and semantic representation of a lexical item. Granted that a certain freedom in the pairings of listemes is an advantage, an obvious step forward would be a grammar-internal theory of permissible pairings between elements of all three lists. This would mark a significant advance towards a theory of a possible lexical item, incorporating among other things a principled account of Blocking phenomena (see Embick and Marantz 2008) .
The fact of having brought to light the need for a sharper delimitation of linguistically possible pairings may in fact be construed as an advantage of the three-list decomposition approach. But the model itself becomes open to question where the listed elements do not neatly fit the description of 'atoms' which can be pairwise related across isomorphic lists. This gives a new urgency to the issue of a proper characterization of the elements in each list.
2.2
The notion of roots as syntactic atoms distinct both from their exponent(s) and their interpretation(s) is certainly a coherent one, and one that I have myself subscribed to and defended, as Harley mentions (Acquaviva 2008, in press; Acquaviva and Panagiotidis 2012 ). What appears problematic in the target article is however the characterization of such syntactic primes as feature bundles, and their identification with the items which make up the Numeration in the sense of Chomsky (1995) . Firstly, it is not at all clear that the content of roots, as opposed to that of grammatical formatives, consists of syntactically legible features. Secondly, Chomsky (1995) held that the initial elements making up the Numeration are fully equipped with semantic and inflectional content (cf. page 231: 'Choices of lexical item LI with different optional features are distinct members of the Numeration'). These may look as superficial matters of detail, but they point to a deeper ambiguity: while Harley describes the syntactic atoms of list 1 as 'individuated by narrow syntax', features like [+Human] for people/person do not seem to play a role (that is, being distributed by Agree) in narrow syntax; nor do the [+Negative, +Evaluative] features tentatively offered for bad/worse, nor any conceivable feature responsible for the lexical-semantic difference between, say, home and house (Chomsky 1995: 230 explicitly viewed a feature like [Artifact] as non-syntactically active). If such features are meant to give an idea of the content of the corresponding interpretation in List 3 (the interpretations), one might comment that nothing makes necessary a featural analysis for the lexical semantic content which minimally distinguishes one lexeme from another when all grammatical formatives are identical. But features are what syntax trades in, and the impression given here is rather that such tentative featural representations are meant to express properties of the syntactic objects taken to constitute List 1. And this attempt to encapsulate semantic substance in the syntactic elements in List 1 would effectively run counter to the insight that syntactic and semantic lexical nuclei are distributed across distinct lists. Indeed, apart from sections 2.3, 2.4, and 4, the paper repeatedly speaks of roots as meaningful elements (for instance, 'the semantic interpretive properties' of the posited root √STUD-in student, see 3.1), rather than of syntax-internal objects associated with a range of interpretations relativized to a context. The background assumption that syntactic roots are contentful comes into the open with the analysis of 'verbal roots' in sections 3.2 and 3.3, which sets aside the fundamental idea of a-categorial syntactic roots to simply identify DM roots with the lexical V of analyses like Kratzer's. Here, the argument-taking properties of the corresponding verbs are directly attributed to roots, which by this move become syntactic entities endowed with the content of verbs. Taking for granted that roots have such argument-taking properties, Harley can then exploit the evidence for a local domain around a lexical head, and attribute this to a root, very specifically identified as a piece of the syntactic representation (so, not a semantic atom of List 3), corresponding to the form stud-of student and study (one wonders what becomes of these argument-taking properties in studio or studiously). This analysis, it seems to me, returns to a lexicalist approach by taking a piece of the form (the morphological root stud-) and attributing syntactic and semantic content to it, a content which exactly corresponds to that of a verb. Although I have no full-fledged analysis to offer for one-pronominalization, it seems at least possible to consider a semantics-based alternative, in which one acts as a proform for a constituent interpretively identified as expressing the description of an individual. It stands to reason that arguments but not modifiers (expressing accessory, non-identifying properties) should be included in this domain; this correctly accounts for cases like this side of the table and that one, where one pronominalizes an argumenttaking noun (in fact a larger constituent, for Adger 2013), rather than a verb. Similarly, the detailed discussion of Hiaki root alternants certainly makes a strong case for positional root allomorphy, but by itself it does not offer an independent argument that roots project and take complements; indeed, the close of 3.3 acknowledges that this conclusion only follows 'together with the other arguments for sisterhood of root and direct object'.
2.3
As the notion of syntactic root forces us to think harder about specifically grammatical aspects of lexical items, the 'interpretive LF instructions' making up List 3 similarly bring out important questions about semantic aspects; namely, about the kind of semantic information that belong in List 3 rather than anywhere else, about how items in this list relate to items in other lists and to larger syntactic representations, and also about how they relate to those constitutive elements of meaning ('senses', 'concepts', . . .) posited on the basis of lexical-semantic analysis or of psycholinguistic or acquisitional evidence. The target article helps distinguish questions concerning the content of semantic atoms themselves from questions about their relation to linguistic representations (here, to syntactic and phonological items in Lists 1 and 2, as well as to representations bigger than roots). I briefly address the former in this paragraph, to discuss the latter in the next section.
That a linguistic representation should contain minimal elements of meaning is not in doubt, simply because without such elements there can be no account of how an unbounded number of syntactic structures can also express an unbounded number of interpretations. If compositional interpretation maps syntactic productivity to semantic productivity, we need semantic atoms to start with. This applies to all unanalyzable elements in a semantic representation, whether they are introduced by grammatical morphemes or not. The questions that arise here concern what does not reduce to grammatical morphemes: essen-tially, what type of content it encodes, and how it relates to other linguistic representations. The approach expounded here answers, respectively, that what does not reduce to grammatical meaning constitutes a list of discrete elements, specified in model-theoretic terms as predicates of a small set of ontological types (entities, events, properties); and that the 'LF instructions' which constitute this semantic lexicon interface with conceptual, non-linguistic cognitive systems (a position reflected in the label 'Encyclopedia' in Harley and Noyer 2000) .
The repeated mention of a 'model-theoretic' characterization seems to suggest that Harley espouses an extensionalist semantic approach, where basic terms of the semantic representation are ultimately defined by what they are true of, in one or more than one world. But this, as noted, cannot possibly shed much light on those aspects of lexical semantic competence based on oppositions in conceptualization rather than in distinct extensions: consider again home vs. house, or broad vs. wide, or use vs. utilize, to say nothing about notorious problematic cases like time, air, or god. It is well to remember that these terms belong to the vocabulary of one particular historical language (in fact, of many distinct psychologically real dialects of it), and that this language globally defines a conceptual/semantic space never entirely overlapping with that of other languages, and within which the content of one term depends as much from its relation to the 'world' as from the relations it has with other terms. Marconi (1997) discusses in depth this distinction between the 'referential' and 'inferentialrelational' character of lexical competence, which has a fundamental importance for any theory of lexical semantic atoms, but gets easily sidelined by the tendency to use English as a metalanguage. This is not, of course, a criticism of the use of paraphrases like 'vomit', 'a light blanket', or 'throw' for labelling the readings which different contexts license for the root associated to the form throw (2.4); we need these paraphrases to grasp the relevant interpretations. But this practical function shades into a hidden theoretical statement when English words (not roots) are mapped one-to-one to elements of the metalanguage, and even used as 'plausibly universal' semantic primes, like go, bad, and person/people in section 2. In that context, Harley actually objects to an account of root suppletion that analyzes these terms as grammatical formatives, definable on a languageindependent basis; but not on the ground that go and person cannot be said to simply 'consist in' the universal predicates GO and PERSON (or [+Human] ), a claim which would entail that English has a privileged relation with the universal semantic vocabulary underlying all natural languages. As discussed in Acquaviva and Panagiotidis (2012) , the use of such capitalized terms as primes in lexical semantic decomposition can conceal open questions even when one makes clear the difference between them and object-language predicates, because after it is made clear that items like GO, DO, or even CAUSE do not mean just 'go', 'do', and 'cause', one should still explicate what they do mean (see Fodor 1998 ). Harley's later mention of the 'agentive' character of Hiaki roots translated as 'run' (see 3.3.) clearly shows that she does not so simplistically identify English paraphrases with the terms of lexical semantic description. But the point deserves greater prominence, in my view. For example, granting that 'human being' is a likely universal (probably with some qualifications), a full appreciation of the language-specific value of person and people would make seem less likely the proposition that they act as singular and plural exponent for one and the same semantic root, as footnote 17 suggests. Apart from the facts discussed there, and from the obvious fact that each form has a singular and a plural, person may apply to entities conceptualized as non-human (as in the doctrine of divine persons, or in the notion of 'personal divinity' which distinguishes theism from deism). Note also that in German, the plural-only Leute 'people' (evidently not a perfect translation) does not fit the context 'the young rebel of 30 years ago and the dignified professor of today are really two different ', which calls for Personen instead.
I have alluded in passing to the fact that the descriptive labels of semantic atoms are words and not roots. This seemingly obvious circumstance (how else could they describe an interpretation?) in fact points to a fundamental mismatch between the category-free status of DM roots as syntactic objects, and the necessarily categorized nature they have when viewed as associated with items of List 3 (cf. again the identification of a syntactic root with Kratzer's lexical V in 3.2). Indeed, it seems obvious that any item in List 3 must be categorized according to some semantic criterion in order to be even a thinkable concept (a point elaborated in Acquaviva 2008 , 2014 , in press, Acquaviva and Panagiotidis 2012 . In Harley's terms, the LF instructions associated with each interpretation impose type-theoretical restrictions. While I disagree with the view that syntactic roots are ontologically categorized for the kind of thing they help to describe (2.4: 'the various √ items may have interpretations as predicates of entities [. . .] , predicates of properties [. . .] . or predicates of events [. . .]'), for reasons laid out in Acquaviva (in press), such a categorization of the interpretations themselves seems definitely required, although possibly along different lines. But why should an interpretation be a property of a syntactic root, rather than of a larger syntactic object? The question is all the more natural given that every interpretation corresponds in fact not just to a choice of root, but to a choice of root in a syntactic context. In Acquaviva (2014, in press ) I sketch out how the ontological categorization of (lexical) interpretations may be the result of how the content of grammatical formatives constrain the semantic space, so that a complex syntactic object involving information relative to event structure and temporal parts is what Harley calls a predicate of events, while one with information relative to classification, division, and quantity results in a predicate of 'entities' (even though events are entities, and there are nouns that are only true of events, like event). In both cases the syntactic root would act as a grammar-internal identifier, defining lexical relatedness. What is compositionally interpreted are the root-external grammatical formatives, which define linguistically regimented interpretation types (paraphraseable as, say, 'discrete countable entity', 'activity'); syntactic roots would identify individual tokens of such types, corresponding to words for what we may call a dog, or running. A thoroughly decompositional account of lexical categories along these lines would sit comfortably with the DM architecture of the lexicon, but only removing the assumption that the semantic facet of lexical listedness must consist of properties of syntactic roots. Within certain limits (the Phases corresponding to the verbal projection which includes the external argument, and to DP), there would be no grammar-imposed constraints on the domain for idiosyncratic word-specific interpretation, as Harley herself concludes.
If semantic listemes are, in effect, indexed by syntactic roots but map to constituents larger than root, the resulting system not only allows for a straightforward representation of lexical concepts as wholes (see the discussion in Acquaviva and Panagiotidis 2014), but may also model the distinction between polysemy and homonymy in formal terms, letting only polysemous words share the very same syntactic root. In other words, interpretations that are related as different 'senses' of the same lexeme, as is plausibly the case for sad as 'in a sad state' and 'inspiring sadness', could be associated with the very same syntactic object, including the root; this would distinguish 'senses' which are variants of one core lexical interpretation (often derived through general cognitive mechanisms, or through a well-defined set of operations, as Pustejovsky 1995 claimed) from interpretations that instead belong to distinct lexemes (with distinct if homonymous roots), as is plausibly the case for race as 'running contest' and as 'genetically identified population'. A modellization along these lines would therefore accord with theories of the mental lexicon where polysemous words are represented differently depending on whether they are homonyms or polysemes (see Pylkkänen, Llinás, and Murphy 2006) , but not with theories that attribute separate representations to each 'sense' regardless of homonymy and polysemy.
Roots as autonomous morphological objects
The slogan 'it's syntax all the way down' allows at least two quite distinct interpretations, which correspond to two different ways to complete the dictum: (i) 'so syntax doesn't stop at word-level, but goes inside', and (ii) 'so there's no room left for morphology as distinct from syntax'. I think that the target article makes a very convincing case for the former, but not for the latter. In fact, it is possible to accept all of Harley's conclusions while upholding a view of morphology as a distinct component of grammar.
In this connection it is important to emphasize, first, the distinction between roots as abstract syntactic objects and roots as 'units of the form'. The distinction obviously presupposes a realizational model of grammar, like that shared by DM, where syntax deals with abstract representations which are then spelled out by phonology or other interface instructions. Harley argues persuasively that the phonological exponents of roots are inserted 'late' (after syntax), just like those realizing every other syntactic terminal, and that syntactic roots are not individuated by their phonological spellout (2.2). Part of the evidence for the latter claim comes from Semitic roots like the Hebrew √KBŠ (from Aronoff 2007) and from Latinate English roots like √CEIVE, which are shown to be 'one' as elements of the form (they display regular alternations that cannot be triggered by phonology), but are associated with 'many' disparate elements of meaning. The notion of 'element of the form' that plays such an important part here is evidently morphological, neither syntactic nor phonological. But it is not the only kind of evidence that makes necessary a morphological level of analysis.
Consider the alternations meet -met and shoot -shot. While met only exists as the past and past participle of a verb, shot has an independent existence as a noun. More generally, across root exponents of the same typological family, we see a similar contrast between form alternants uniquely linked to one syntactic (and semantic) root, and alternants that are more independent. For example, in French, the feminine, but not the masculine, form of an adjective (when the two differ) also appears as base for the derivation of complex words, like secheresse (/seʃʁεs/ 'dryness, draught' from the fem. sèche (/sεʃ/) 'dry. (masc. sec /sεk/); in Italian, the verb uscire 'to go out' makes use of the two root alternants escand usc-(/uʃ/), of which only the latter appears on different lexemes, namely the nouns uscio 'door' and usciere 'doorman'. Not all suppletive forms work like that: Irish has suppletive alternants for a few verbs, and they only appear in that function and in no other lexeme, like the past rinne for the verb 'to do', whose root is déan-in the rest of the paradigm. Not all 'units of the form' are alike, then, since some have a special property (the possibility of occurring across lexemes in unrelated grammatical contexts) that can be stated only in morphological terms. Conversely, there are of course cases where morphology imposes formal distinctions that have no phonological or syntactic (or semantic) basis; for example, in alternations between derivationally related forms like flute -flautist or GlasgowGlaswegian (or Manchester -Mancunian) .
What this suggests is that the exponents in List 2 are not all just phonological representations, but can have a more complex nature. This justifies the notion of a morphological root, distinct at the same time from a syntactic root and from a phonological exponent. As I suggested in (Acquaviva 2008) , it is roots qua morphological objects that can have idiosyncratic properties like syllabic or templatic constraints, or which can be restricted to one lexical category, in contrast with the more abstract syntactic roots.
Finally, making room for a notion of morphological root would allow us to think of atomic, unanalyzable syntactic roots as realized by morphologically complex objects. This suggests itself as a plausible analysis of cases like virtuosity, which Marantz (2003) pointed out is not built from virtuous, but from virtuoso: it suffices to claim that the noun virtuoso is syntactically represented by one atomic root (and a noun-defining extended projection) which in turn is spelled out by a complex morphological structure. Within this structure we can isolate the same (morphological) root that appears in virtue, followed by a root extension. Again, as in the discussion of the relation between syntactic roots and lexical semantic atoms, it seems to me that empirical and theoretical payoffs would derive from pursuing the factorization of the lexicon envisaged by DM with an even sharper distinction between distinct aspects of the notion of root.
